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Abstract 
Research on the impact of the macro economy on individual-level preferences for 
redistribution has produced varying results. This paper presents a new theory on the presence 
of an expansive welfare state during one's formative years as a source of heterogeneity in the 
effect that macroeconomic conditions have on individuals' preferences for redistributive 
policy. We test this theory using cohort analysis via the British Social Attitudes surveys 
(1983-2010), with generations coming of age between the end of World War I and today. 
Findings confirm that cohorts that were socialized before and after the introduction of the 
welfare state react differently to economic crises: the former become less supportive of 
redistribution, while the latter become more supportive. Our research sheds light on the 
long-term shifts of support for the welfare state due to generational replacement. 
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	Redistributive policy is a core function of all developed democratic states, and it has been 
particularly salient in the wake of the Great Recession, the Occupy movement, and tensions 
in the Eurozone. Have these events resulted in shifts in redistributive preferences? Recent 
work suggests that the current economic crisis has not fundamentally changed either welfare 
state policy, or citizens' demands for more state intervention (Kenworthy and Owens 2011, 
Soroka and Wlezien 2014, Margalit 2013, Bermeo and Bartels 2014). This is not to say that 
there is no change – there is a good deal of work showing long-term trends in redistributive 
preferences over time (Page and Shapiro 1992, Durr 1993, Stevenson 2001, Erikson et al. 
2002; Soroka and Wlezien 2010). But existing work suggests a good degree of stability as 
well. 
What accounts for change and stability in individuals' redistributive preferences? This 
question has produced a vast and valuable body of work examining how and why citizens 
prefer more or less redistributive policy (and, as a consequence, the level of redistributive 
policy pursed from one country to the next, and/or over time). In this article, we seek to add 
to that literature, focusing on the effect of the national economy on individuals' redistributive 
preferences. Research on these contextual effects on individuals is not new. But studies 
testing the impact of the national economy on voters' redistribution preferences have 
produced contradictory evidence. Some argue that national economic hardship leads to an 
increase in demand for government protection (Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Blekesaune 
2007; Kam and Nam 2008), while others find economic crises cause people to be less 
supportive of redistributive policy, less concerned with income inequalities, and more 
focused on their own self-interest (Alt 1979; Durr 1993; Stevenson 2001). We argue that both 
may be true, albeit at different times and for different people, whereby the existence of a 
welfare state is crucial in determining the direction of the impact of economic hardship on 
redistribution preferences. Demand for government protection can only increase in times of 
	crises if people have a welfare state to turn to. If a welfare state does not exist, we expect the 
opposite effect: people become more self-interested and less solidarity for those less well off. 
We expect that this dynamic plays out not just concurrently, but through past 
experience with a welfare state. Indeed, we expect that individuals' reactions to economic 
circumstances are not just a consequence of the current context, but also the economic and 
political contexts in which individuals come of age. We thus draw on work on political 
socialization showing that a range of political values and attitudes are crystallized early in 
adulthood (Inglehart 1971, 1990; Jennings 1989; Alwin and Krosnick 1991; Sears and 
Valentino 1997). These studies argue that individuals are most impressionable during their 
adolescence; and once opinions and identities are formed, they remain relatively stable over a 
citizen's life cycle. Our aim below is to transfer this logic to the question of social policy 
preferences. We thereby rely on an age, period, cohort (APC) analysis that allows us to 
disentangle the effect of current economic conditions from the formative experience of 
different generations of British voters; we compare individuals who came of age before the 
rise of the welfare state with those who came of age in more recent decades. This account of 
redistributive preferences helps explain long-term stability in individual-level redistributive 
preferences. It allows for aggregate-level longitudinal change, through generational 
replacement. It also accommodates short-term change in preferences, in response to 
economic conditions – albeit with the expectation that short-term change will be conditioned 
over the long term by formative-year experiences with, or without, a welfare state. 
We begin by reviewing the existing literature on redistributive policy preferences, and 
on 'socialization effects', in which our welfare state hypothesis is situated. We then discuss 
the British Social Attitudes (BSA) surveys, fielded (nearly) annually from 1983 to 2010. 
These repeated cross-sectional surveys include respondents coming of age between 1916 and 
today, covering an exceptionally interesting and variable time in modern British history — 
	indeed, covering the rise of the redistributive welfare state in its entirety. We find evidence 
that economic conditions during our formative years play an important role in shaping our 
economic preferences — preferences that persist throughout later life. We then turn to the 
impact of policy climate — essentially, the existence of a welfare state as a moderator of the 
impact of economic conditions. Results support the hypothesis that experience with poor 
economic conditions at a time where there is little to no welfare state engenders a different 
sets of reactions to economic insecurity than do the same economic conditions in a time 
where there is a vast welfare state. These findings are discussed as they pertain to work on 
political economy, attitude stability, and socialization effects. 
 
The Economy and Redistributive Preferences 
Redistributive policy preferences have received a good deal of attention in political science 
and economic research. There is a considerable body of work focused on the role of 
redistributive and/or economic policy preferences in electoral decision-making, for instance 
(Fiorina 1978; Palmer and Whitten 1999; Nadeau and Lewis-Beck 2001; Erikson et al. 2002; 
Clarke et al. 2004; Duch and Stevenson 2008; Norpoth et al. 1991); and given the importance 
of economic and redistributive policy in elections, it should come as no surprise that a 
growing literature also shows that citizens' preferences are an important factor shaping 
governments' choice of redistributive policies (Brooks and Manza 2007; Hamann and Kelly 
2010; Wlezien 2004; Soroka and Wlezien 2012). There is of course also a considerable body 
of work that explores redistributive preferences in their own right (for a recent review see 
Alesina and Giuliano 2011). 
One long-standing body of work focuses on redistributive preferences as the product 
of a simple calculation of individuals' expected future income and anticipated tax returns (e.g. 
Meltzer and Richard 1981). In recent years, research on 'risk exposure,' measured mainly by 
	skills and occupation sector, has received a lot of attention, and added to existing 
individual-level models (e.g. Iversen and Soskice 2001; Cusack et al. 2006; Rehm 2009). 
Both bodies of work — on the basic calculus of redistributive policy support, and on risk 
exposure — point in the same direction: voters are self-interested, and those who are or are 
more likely to become recipients of welfare state benefits will be more supportive of 
redistributive policies than those who are less likely to receive them (e.g. Hasenfeld and 
Rafferty 1989; Bean and Papadakis 1998; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005). This widely-held 
view of redistributive preferences assumes individuals to be risk-averse, rational and 
self-interested.1 
Two competing hypotheses 
The exiting literature has nevertheless recognized that self-interest alone cannot explain 
preferences for redistribution — there are simply too many people who are supportive, or 
unsupportive, of redistribution even when it is disadvantageous to them personally. There is 
accordingly a considerable body of work focused on additional drivers of redistributive 
support. The recent economic recession has sparked a renewed interest in this theme. In 
particular, it has encouraged us to ask, how are redistributive preferences likely to react to 
economic crises? 
The literature points in two directions. First, economic hardship should lead to 
increased support for redistributive policy. This could be a product of a greater number of 
individuals directly (or indirectly) experiencing hardship; it may also be that the proportion of 
individuals who view themselves as 'at risk' increases alongside aggregate-level hardship. 
                                                
1 There is one additional individual-level approach not reviewed in detail here, because we 
do not investigate it below. This alternative approach focuses on the notion that general 
ideological predispositions are critical to individuals' welfare state attitudes. This approach 
has been particularly prevalent in the literature on Americans' welfare state attitudes. See, 
e.g., Feldman and Zaller (1992); Jacoby (1994); Margalit (2013). However, our focus is on 
the national economic context rather than ideology. We will discuss this point further in the 
concluding section. 
	Periods of economic insecurity and economic deprivation may therefore lead to stronger 
public support for leftist social policies (e.g. Lipset 1968; Gilens 1999); and this claim finds 
some support in the literature(Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Blekesaune 2007; Kam and 
Nam 2008). This work suggests that in times of (aggregate-level) economic success, the 
expected risk of an income or job loss is relatively low and hence so too is support for 
redistribution. On the other side, during economic crises individuals feel more at risk of 
losing employment/income, and thus demand more redistributive policy. We refer to this 
possibility, where aggregate-level economic hardship leads to higher demand for social 
protection, as the government protection hypothesis. 
There is however a growing body of work that suggests the opposite dynamic: 
economic crises cause people to be less supportive of redistributive policy, less concerned 
with income inequalities, and more focused on their own self-interest (Alt 1979; Stevenson 
2001; Soroka and Wlezien 2010). Durr’s central hypothesis is that a liberal policy agenda 
“does not come cheap” (1993: 159) and he consequently describes generous welfare as a 
luxury good. If money becomes scarce in times of national economic crises, its value relative 
to other goods (e.g., the utility gained by contributing to the betterment of strangers) 
increases and hence individuals are expected to be less willing to spend this scarce resource 
on welfare programs. So aggregate-level support for redistributive policy may actually 
decline in periods of economic hardship. We refer to this as the luxury good hypothesis. 
Note that these two hypotheses suggest very different perspectives of redistributive 
policy support. The government protection hypothesis emphasizes those willing to give in 
order to cover for possible economic deprivation of oneself and others. The luxury good 
hypothesis emphasizes those who are more deeply self-interested, i.e., less willing to give 
part of their own personal income in times of crises (even when they themselves may be at 
risk). Of course, both types of individuals will exist at any given time. But the literature is 
	currently divided on which is more prevalent; and indeed findings are divided between the 
two. This may partly be because different studies focus on somewhat different 
macroeconomic measures. It may also be because a good number of analyses focus on 
aggregate-level dynamics, and miss individual-level heterogeneity. But even individual-level 
models have yet to explore the possibility that we focus on below: the role of the welfare 
state, in one's youth, as an enduring moderator of the impact of economic conditions on 
redistributive preferences. 
The welfare state, economic crisis, and redistributive preferences 
Our main theoretical argument is that the impact that economic change has on individuals' 
redistributive preferences has changed over time, with the rise of the welfare state. Work on 
welfare politics already points to the possibility that as welfare states develop, citizens will 
come to expect different things from governments. Cross-national research has shown that 
attitudes towards welfare polices and notions of solidarity are partly a product of institutional 
characteristics and general welfare regimes (see e.g., Korpi 1980; Edlund 1999; 
Esping-Andersen 1999; Svallfors 1997; Arts and Gelissen 2001; Pfeifer 2009; Larsen 2007; 
Jaeger 2006, 2009; Dallinger 2010). The empirical literature has been somewhat concerned 
with issues of causality, since it is in most cases not clear whether preferences precede or 
follow policy (see Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003) for a discussion). Welfare states are in 
part the product of public preferences for financial protection, after all. The question of which 
came first, preferences or policy, is of peripheral importance here, however — our interest is 
in the possibility that the existence of a welfare state conditions individuals' ideas about 
government responsibility when the economy falters, i.e., it encourages a shift in what 
citizens expect from government. The impact of economic conditions on public preferences 
for redistribution may, in short, be moderated by the (non-)existence of policies designed to 
protect individuals from economic crises. 
	 Note that this expectation is in line with work suggesting that past economic 
experience, and perhaps especially the experience of economic crisis, can matter for attitudes 
towards redistribution (e.g., Corneo and Gruener 2002; Guillaud 2013; Gonthier 2017; 
Piketty 1995). There also is work suggesting the lasting impact of political institutions on 
preferences, leveraging in particular the experiences of East and West Germans before and 
then after unification (e.g., Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 2008; Svallfors 2010). Like this 
past work, we argue for the relevance of past experience on current attitudes, albeit in 
interaction, and for an even more extended period of time.  
Our expectation, broadly speaking, is as follows. Experiencing an economic crisis in a 
period when a person has to fend for herself produces a set of beliefs (i.e., self-reliance) that 
tend to reduce welfare state support (following the logic of the luxury good hypothesis), 
while experiencing an economic crisis in a period when there is a welfare state upon which 
people can rely on engenders increased support for state-run redistribution (following the 
logic of the government protection hypothesis). Restated in the form of a welfare state 
hypothesis: Individuals who face general economic hardship at a time when there is an 
expansive welfare state come to expect/support state programs that help those in financial 
need. The same is not true for those who experience hardship in the absence of a welfare 
state. 
Formative experiences of the economy and the welfare state  
Today some form of a welfare state exists in all advanced Western democracies. One test of 
our welfare state hypothesis thus requires that we go back in time before the expansion of 
government protection, and it is of course rather difficult to study individuals' redistributive 
preferences in the distant past. Our interests hinge on theories of political socialization, 
however, and the impact of formative experiences on the development and crystallization of 
redistribution preferences. There are certainly diverging views as to whether political 
	attitudes and preferences are stable over one's life span, but the importance of the 
impressionable or formative years between childhood and adulthood is generally accepted 
(see e.g., Braungart and Braungart 1986; Sears and Funk 1999; Highton and Wolfinger 2001; 
Plutzer 2002; Bartels and Jackman 2014). Young citizens, it is believed, are not yet set in 
their political ways and are subsequently more easily influenced by external factors (Jennings 
1989; Alwin and Krosnick 1991; Sears and Valentino 1977). 
Hyman (1959) was among the first to draw attention to the necessity of studying 
processes of early socialization, which he defined as an individual's “learning of social 
patterns corresponding to his societal position as mediated through various agencies of 
society” (Hyman 1959: 25). Such agencies can be diverse: family, peers, school, mass media, 
and — as is the focus of our study — even the state of the national economy. The assumption 
is that the economic circumstances under which citizens grow up have a lasting effect on the 
economic and ideological preferences of the respective generation. If, for example, 
individuals grow up under an economic recession, they might always have a lasting 
predisposition towards more, or less, redistribution. 
We are aware of only three studies that have investigated the socialization effects of 
macro contexts on redistributive or economic attitudes, focusing on economic risk taking 
(Malmendier and Nagel 2011), the perceived importance individuals ascribe to fighting rising 
prices (Ehrmann and Tzamourani 2012) and on individuals' economic preferences 
respectively (Giuliano and Spilimbergo 2014).2 This small literature on the socialization 
                                                
2 The closest study to ours is the one by Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014), who also rely on a 
cohort analysis using data from the US. Their findings support the government protection 
hypothesis. The difference of our study is the emphasis of the welfare state as a possible 
moderator of economic crises. In the case of the US the Great Depression in the 1930s 
sparked the intervention of the state with the introduction of the New Deal. Hence, they are 
not able to contrast cohorts that experience economic crises with and without state protection. 
Rather the opposite, in times of enormous economic hardship, the state established itself as a 
protector, which might explain that the generation of the Great Depression is more liberal 
than subsequent cohorts. This is in line with our expectation.  
	effects of macroeconomic conditions is related to a rather broader body of work on 
socialization and political values. Perhaps the most well-known – albeit contested (see e.g., 
Clarke and Dutt 1991; Duch and Taylor 1993, 1994) – example is Inglehart's argument that 
economic security during people's formative years leads to lasting postmaterialist values 
(e.g., Inglehart 1971, 1990; Inglehart and Abramson 1994). 
We aim here to transfer this same logic to preferences for redistributive policy, which 
we regard as a function of a combination of both current and past economic conditions. We 
believe that redistributive preferences (partly) crystallize during a period of mental plasticity 
in adolescents, and then remain in later-life attitudes.3 
 
An Empirical Test 
We test three hypotheses – the government protection, luxury good, and welfare state 
hypotheses – using a single country, the UK, over an extended period. Focusing on 
within-country change has advantages over a cross-national approach, where a greater 
number of unobserved factors (and histories) exist that could drive both states' welfare 
regimes and individuals' redistributive preferences. Many different factors could affect 
individuals' support for redistribution (e.g. political institutions, norms and culture), which 
are usually unobserved. The advantage of focusing on one country over time is to overcome 
these unobserved cross-country differences. 4  Our data provide a relatively unique 
opportunity to test the link between the rise of the welfare state and public preferences for 
redistribution. In short, we can test a model that allows for the possibility that citizens who 
experience economic downturns in the UK before the development of the welfare state may 
                                                
3 These formative experiences might be transcended by more recent events, of course.  
4 There are some advantages to cross-national analyses, of course, rather than a single case 
study, not least because results from cross-national work seem to be more clearly 
generalizable. But the UK is not unique is its 20th-century experiences with either the 
economy or redistributive policy.  
	be affected differently than those who experience similar economic circumstances after the 
development of the welfare state. 
We choose the UK as our case study for both pragmatic and theoretical reasons. 
Pragmatically speaking, the UK is one of the few countries in the world where there has been 
an available, nationally-representative opinion survey capturing preferences for redistribution 
over an extended period of time. But the UK is also of particular interest for the kind of 
analysis we wish to pursue. Like many other countries, the UK has seen a major extension of 
the welfare state in the post-war era. Debates about the size and scope of the British welfare 
state have been prominent, and ongoing. Moreover, the UK has been subject to a series of 
economic crises over the past century, affecting (to various degrees) unemployment and 
general economic development. In the case of the UK, in short, the argument that there are 
cohorts that come of age in quite different economic environments seems relatively easy to 
make. Whether that has any lasting effect of preferences for redistribution is the subject of 
the empirical tests presented below. 
 
Data & Variables 
Previous research has typically focused on either individual-level or contextual variables in 
accounting for variation in redistributive policy preferences. On the contextual front, studies 
have tended to use time-series analysis to track changes in macro-economic indicators on 
aggregated policy preferences (e.g., Durr 1993; Stevenson 2001; Erikson et al. 2002). 
Individual-level work, on the other hand, tends to ignore the macro-economic context (e.g., 
Margalit 2013). There are only very few studies that combined these two (Blekesaune and 
Quadagno 2003; Blekesaune 2007; Kam and Nam 2008). Our research design attempts to add 
to this short list, combining individual-level and macro-economic factors through hierarchical 
modeling. We rely here on data from the nationally representative repeated cross-sectional 
	British Social Attitudes (BSA) surveys, for which data is available annually from 1983 to 
2010 (except for 1988 and 1992).5 The basic logic of our research design assumes that 
respondents are nested within survey years — for which we include a number of variables 
representing the current national economic context, varying across the 22 different survey 
field dates. Respondents are also (cross-) nested in socialization cohorts — the source of our 
data on past economic experiences. The means by which we assign respondents to cohorts, 
and add economic contextual variables, is discussed in more detail below. 
Measuring Social Policy Preferences 
Our main dependent variable is an index based on four regularly-asked questions relating to 
redistributive policy, emphasizing redistribution conceived as giving to the 'poor' (Cavaille ́ 
and Trump 2015). Those questions are as follows: (1) How much do you agree or disagree 
that: government should redistribute income from the better-off to those who are less well 
off? [agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree strongly]; (2) How 
much do you agree that: Ordinary working people do not get their fair share of the nation's 
wealth [agree strongly, agree, disagree, disagree strongly]; (3) The government should spend 
more money on welfare benefits for the poor, even if it leads to higher taxes [agree strongly, 
agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree strongly]; (4) If welfare benefits weren't 
so generous, people would learn to stand on their own two feet [agree strongly, agree, neither 
agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree strongly]. We rely here on a simple index of these 
measures, equally weighted, and ranging from zero to 100, where zero implies no support for 
redistribution, and 100 implies complete support for redistribution (i.e., pro-redistribution on 
all four items).6 
                                                
5 The data are available for download at http://www.esds.ac.uk/findingData/bsaTitles.asp.  
6 Not all questions are asked of all respondents in all years. We accordingly use an index that 
attributes values to any respondent for whom there are two or more non-missing responses. 
Doing so increases our working sample considerably (from roughly 44 to 62 thousand 
respondents); it also makes little difference to our estimates. See the Appendix for basic 
	We readily acknowledge that there are some weaknesses to using an index to capture 
policy preferences, but believe that in this case they are far outweighed by the advantages. 
We note first that the questions capture somewhat different aspects of support for 
redistributive policy, including attitudes about redistribution generally, about income 
inequality, about welfare benefits, and about welfare recipients. This variance is by design. 
We wish to tell a general story about preferences of redistributive to the 'poor', and so want to 
rely on a measure that is suitably general; and there is an argument in the literature 
supporting the notion that redistributive preferences are complex, and thus best dealt with 
using multiple questions (Margalit 2013; see also Ansolabehere et al. 2008) for a discussion 
on the use of multiple measures). That said, the four measures we rely on here are reasonably 
strongly related; the four-item scale has a Cronbach's alpha of 0.64, suggesting a reasonable 
degree of inter-item correlation. In order to test whether the results of our models are affected 
by using the index, we replicate the models using each item separately (rather than the index 
as a whole). The results suggest both that findings are not markedly different across 
measures, and that our index-based results provide a good summary of the item-by-item 
analyses. As a diagnostic check, we provide these item-by-item analysis in the Appendix.  
Measuring Cohorts 
As we are interested in generational differences, one of the most important variables in our 
analysis is the one measuring cohorts. Following standard strategies in the literature, we 
group respondents into five-year birth cohorts (Fienberg and Mason 1979; Mason et al. 1973; 
Duch and Taylor 1993). In order to test the impact of economic hardship we match the 
information of the economic context during the crucial formative years to each five-year 
cohort. 
                                                                                                                                                  
descriptive data on the redistribution index over time, as well as estimates of our models 
constrained to respondents with three or more (rather than just two) non-missing responses to 
the four items in our index. 
	We define the formative years between the ages 15-20 for theoretical and empirical 
reasons.7 Theoretically speaking, this is an age at which many people make crucial decisions 
about their occupation, which in most cases determines a person's income and later-life risk 
exposure.8 Moreover, economic crises often affect young people in particular.9 We therefore 
suspect that the economic conditions at this point in the life-cycle are crucial in crystallizing 
beliefs about the responsibility of the individual and the role of the state. 
The empirical justification for the chosen age-range is based on evidence suggesting 
the importance of the 15- to 20-year period. Bartels and Jackman (2014) provide an empirical 
test for what those “critical years” are by analyzing changes in partisanship across different 
generations. Their findings confirm that the political climate during adolescence has the 
strongest impact on the development and stability of party identification. We accordingly use 
15 to 20 years old as the crucial period. Every respondent who turned 15 during each 
five-year interval is accordingly grouped into one cohort. To give an illustration: consider for 
example our first cohort that spans over the years 1916 to 1920. This cohort encompasses 
respondents born between 1901 and 1905. The oldest in this group (born 1901) had all their 
critical years within 1916-1920, while the youngest (born 1905) turned 15 in 1920. Using this 
                                                
7 Some might argue that socialization happens earlier than 15 or later than 20. In the 
Appendix we report the results of the main model, reported in Table 2 for different age 
ranges, matching the economic conditions. We use the following socialization ages of the 
BSA respondents: 10-15, 15-20, 20-25, 25-30, and 30-35. Table A7 shows that empirically 
the strongest effects occur at the youngest age of 10-15 years old. The variance component is 
the lowest and the effect of unemployment and GDP growth is the strongest on current 
redistribution preferences. These effects then become weaker as we use older socialization 
ages and vanish at the ages 25 and above. 
8 The typical age to finish schooling is now 16-18, but has been slightly lower in the past. 
9 For example, a recent study by Bell and Blanchflower (2011) found that young people aged 
16-24 have suffered disproportionately during the recession. 
	logic, we assign our respondents into one of eighteen cohorts coming of age between 1916 
and 2005.10 
Measuring Economic Hardship and Welfare State Expansion 
To capture the economic context, we attach to each respondent a series of economic 
indicators, averaged over the five-year interval corresponding to their cohort. There are of 
course many possible options for economic indicators, but based on previous research we 
rely on a relatively simple pair of economic variables: the unemployment rate and annual per 
capita GDP growth.11 The annual unemployment rate is drawn from the British Office of 
National Statistic (ONS) data back to 1965, and before that we rely on data reported in 
Mitchell (1988); per capita GDP growth is based on data from the OECD back to 1970 and 
Mitchell (1988) before.12 Table 1 reports basic descriptive data for each of our contextual 
measures, for each cohort. The table makes clear that there is real variance in the economic 
context across cohorts. For example, the generation that came of age in the early 1930s 
experienced extremely high unemployment, while the cohorts that came of age during or just 
after World War II were mainly affected by low GDP growth. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Note that for each cohort-level variable there is a current equivalent (not reported in Table 1). 
That is, we include the five-year average of the unemployment rate for respondents coming 
of age in a given cohort; we also include the current unemployment rate in the year in which 
                                                
10 Note that we cannot simply assign each individual to a annual cohort – we must group 
cohorts in order for the model to be identified. See the discussion in the Modeling section, 
below. 
11 The most obvious exclusion from this list is the inflation rate. We exclude it here based in 
part on concerns about collinearity, and in part on results from preliminary tests in which the 
two included variables, both in the past and in the present, show systematic relationships with 
our dependent variable. This was not the case for inflation. 
12 Whenever two separate series are merged, we use backward interpolation – interpolating 
the newest series backward using percentage changes in the old series – to ensure that there is 
not a punctuation that is a consequence of merging slightly different data series. 
	the respondent was surveyed. This way we measure the impact of context both currently, and 
in a respondents' “impressionable” years. 
We capture the expansion of the welfare state very simply: we use a binary variable, 
equal to 0 for all cohorts up to 1945, and equal to 1 for all cohorts from 1950 onwards. We do 
so for several reasons. First and foremost, we regard the existence of a welfare state as being 
related to some combination of contributory and non-contributory programs, as well as a 
general 'sense' that the state has taken on a set of welfare-oriented obligations. This cannot be 
easily captured using budgetary measures. But reliable budgetary measures also do not exist 
over the entire period under study here. The welfare state was only introduced after the end of 
World War II, and so there are no reliable records of government's social spending until 
1947. There also is no highly-reliable budgetary data that spans the entire post-war era 
(Soroka et al. 2006). Thankfully for our research, the British welfare state came into being 
over a rather narrow time frame. In 1944, the Education Act; in 1945, the Family Allowances 
Act, and the National Insurance Act; in 1946, the National Insurance - Industrial Injuries Act; 
in 1947, the Town and Country Planning Act; and in 1948, the National Assistance Act, the 
National Health Service Act, and the Children's Act. These were the central policies in the 
establishment of social security, welfare, health care, education and council housing - and 
they all occurred over a brief 5-year period. We accordingly rely on a binary variable, which 
we believe captures well the introduction of the British welfare state. 
Lastly, as a control variable we include a variable equal to 1 for cohorts coming of 
age during one of the two world wars to account for the possibility that the world wars were 
very powerful formative experiences, economically and otherwise. We accordingly test for a 
resulting shift in redistributive preferences. 
	Capturing Individual-Level Characteristics 
Existing research on redistribution preferences suggests a number of critical individual-level 
predictors.13 These are, for our purposes, viewed mainly as control variables — we need to 
account for individual-level variation so that we can better isolate generational differences as 
well as account for individual's economic self-interest. These variables are as follows: (1) age 
(in years); (2) gender (1=female); (3) education (1=higher education degree); (4) marital 
status (1 = married); (5) belonging to religious denomination (1=belongs); (6) geographical 
region (binary variables capturing six regions – Scotland, NE/NW/York/Humberland, East 
and West Midlands, Wales, SW/SE/Eastern, and London); (7) house ownership (1=owns 
house); (8) income (quintiles, determined annually); (9) employment status (binary variables 
for working full-time, and unemployed; reference is not working, i.e. retired, student); (10) 
union membership. 14  The particular importance of including age is discussed in the 
following section; though note that it, along with gender, education, income, house 
ownership, marital status, employment, and region are linked to socio-economic status, and 
are thus standard predictors of preferences on redistributive policy. Religion and union 
membership are, based on past work, expected to be related to the ideological predispositions 
of respondents. We refrain from including partisanship as a predictor, as it is partly 
endogenous to economic perception and our dependent variable (Page and Jones 1979; Evans 
and Andersen 2006). 
Modeling 
The last column of Table 1 reports the mean redistribution preferences for each cohort from 
1916-2005. It seems that there is a gradual decline in pro-welfare state attitudes with every 
new cohort coming into the population. This would contradict our expectations that 
                                                
13 The literature on which we base the individual-level predictors included here is vast, but 
see, e.g., Alesina and Giuliano (2011); Iversen and Soskice (2001); Cusack et al. (2006); 
Rehm (2009). 
14 Appendix tables report the descriptive statistics of all variables used here.  
	especially the cohorts of the 1930s that came of age during the Great Depression, but did not 
have a welfare state to rely on, to be less redistributive. The problem looking just at averages 
for groups of generations is the confounding factors of age and current economic conditions. 
In order to single out factors that induce cohort differences in redistribution 
preferences it is essential to account for age as well as period effects. The most problematic 
features of age-related research have to do with the difficulty of separating out the effects of 
age, (current) period, and cohort (Glenn 2005; Neundorf and Niemi 2014). The three factors 
cannot be identified in simple cross-sectional survey data, of course, since each factor is 
(almost) completely determined by the other two. But if we fail to account for all three 
effects, we cannot know whether an observed economic attitude (𝑌!"#) of an individual i 
(𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝐼) is because she belongs to a specific cohort j (𝐶!;  𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝐽) or because of her 
age (𝐴!") or the current time t (𝑃!;  𝑡 = 1, . . . ,𝑇; which is typically measured by the survey 
year). To be clear, these three factors are related in the following way: 
 𝐶! = 𝑃! − 𝐴!" (1) 
The identification of the linear APC effects is impossible. Recent advances in social 
statistical analysis of age, period, cohort (APC) models by Yang and colleagues (Yang 2006, 
Yang and Land 2006; see also Smets and Neundorf 2014 for a politics application) make 
clear the advantages of hierarchical modeling to overcome this identification problem. More 
specifically, Yang suggests the use of mixed (fixed and random effects) models allowing for 
random-intercepts to account for the cross-classified grouping of cohorts and periods (survey 
years). The advantage of the HAPC model, as proposed by Yang and her colleagues, is that it 
estimates the cohort and period effects as random effects, which does not impose linearity. 
This solves the identification problem.15 The second advantage of these models is the ability 
                                                
15 In our models the grouping of cohorts into five-year intervals also forces these grouped 
birth-years to have identical effects – this is an additional (more traditional) way to deal with 
the identification problem in APC-models (Fienberg and Mason 1979; Mason et al. 1973). 
	to test why cohorts (or periods) are different from one another. Modeling cohorts as random 
effects allows the inclusion of substantively interesting factors such as in our case macro 
economic factors or the existence of the welfare state to test theoretical expectations about 
the cohort variability. No other model that currently exists allows doing this.16 
The rationale behind the cross-classified random intercepts of cohort and period 
effects is quite simple. Cohorts are usually defined as a group of individuals who were born 
at the same time and hence grew up under the same political, economic, and social 
circumstances. As citizens who came of age at roughly the same time, share common 
circumstances, we can assume the errors in a model explaining their economic preferences 
are dependent. It is thus necessary to account for this error-correlation by applying random 
intercept models. Moreover, these cohorts are clustered within the same survey year. In 
repeated cross-sectional surveys such as the BSA used in this research, “individuals are 
nested within cells created by the cross-classification of two types of social context: birth 
cohorts and survey years” (Yang and Land 2006: 86). Hence the models presented below 
estimate fixed effects for age and other individual-level covariates as well as cross-classified 
random effects for period and cohort. Once we have taken into account the nested character 
of the data it is possible to evaluate the influence of context-specific variables – such as the 
unemployment or GDP growth rate during a respondent's formative years as well as the 
impact of welfare state expansion – on her redistribution preferences. Such a hierarchical 
age-period-cohort (HAPC) regression model for the index measuring redistribution 
preferences of the ith respondent for 𝑖 = 1, . . . ,𝑛!" within the jth cohort for 𝑗 = 1, . . . ,18 
                                                
16 Bell and Jones (2013, 2014a, b) have challenged the validity of HAPC models recently. 
However, their work has in turn have been contested by a group of 13 social statisticians who 
defend the HAPC model (Reither et al. 2015a, b). As Bell and Jones (2014a) argue 
themselves the HAPC model works if we do not assume an underlying liner cohort trend. As 
we theorize that the cohort effect is driven by fluctuating economic conditions of economic 
growth and unemployment rates as well as the existence of a welfare state, we do not expect 
a linear cohort effect 
	socialization cohorts and the tth time period (or survey year) for 𝑇 = 1, . . . ,22 can be 
specified as follows:17 𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!"# = 𝛼!!" + 𝛽! ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒!" +  !!!! 𝛽! ∗ 𝑋!" + 𝜀!!" , 𝜀!"#~𝑁(0,𝜎!)    (2) 
We estimate four models below. The first includes only the age of respondents (Pure 
APC Model). The second model — as presented in equation 2 — controls for m individual 
characteristics (𝑚 = 2, . . ,𝑀) X such as income, education and others described above 
(Demographic Model).18 Most importantly, model 2 includes a random intercept 𝛼!!" , 
which specifies whether the overall mean redistribution preferences vary significantly from 
cohort to cohort and from period to period. These hierarchical models allow us, then, to 
capture the contextual effects of period and cohort; they can reveal the extent to which 
individuals' attitudes are shaped by the both the current economic environment, and that 
environment during their impressionable years. Consider: 
 𝛼!!" = 𝛾! +  !!!! 𝛾! ∗ 𝑍!" +  !!!! 𝛿! ∗ 𝑃!" + 𝑢!!! + 𝜈!!! (3) 
where 𝛾! is the mean effect of all time periods across all cohorts. 𝑢!!! denotes a cohort 
specific error term (𝑢!!!~𝑁(0, 𝜏!)) and 𝜈!!! a time specific error (𝜈!!!~𝑁(0, 𝜏!)). This 
model includes l (𝑙 = 1, . . , 𝐿) covariates Z that account for economic context during the 
formative years of respondent i. These are assumed to explain intercohort variation in levels 
of redistribution preferences. The model also includes k (𝑘 = 1, . . ,𝐾) covariates P that take 
into account the current economic situation. Model 3 is the Combined Context Model 
reports the effects of the current and socialization economic condition on individuals' 
redistribution preferences. Models 4 tests the interaction between the existence of the welfare 
state and the economic socialization context, by first using a dummy variable for cohorts that 
                                                
17 See Snijders and Bosker (1999: 155-165) for a general introductory discussion of these 
cross-classified random models. 
18 As this model does not include a random slope-coefficient it is not necessary to center the 
individual-level explanatory variables (Snijders and Bosker 1999: 80-81). 
	were socialized before and after the establishment of the British welfare state (Welfare Exist 
Model). 
 
Results 
Results from all four models are included in Table 2. The table includes all coefficients in the 
model except for region.19 We first focus on the results of the APC components of the 
model, before turning to the direction of the macro economy on redistribution preferences 
(testing our two competing hypotheses) and lastly, we discuss the results of the welfare state 
hypothesis.  (We do not discuss all individual-level demographic variables in detail here, but 
regard these as important control variables only.)  
[Table 2 about here] 
The first column shows the simple APC model. Results indicate that there is no 
impact of age. Variance components, reported at the bottom of the table, suggest insignificant 
variance across socialization cohorts, but significant variance across survey periods (current 
context). Adding a basic set of demographic controls in Model 2 changes things considerably, 
however. We will not discuss demographic controls in very much detail here, although there 
are some results worth noting. Most are in line with past work: support for redistribution 
increases with union membership and education, and decreases with income and home 
ownership, cetris paribus. Female respondents are less supportive of redistribution in these 
models, and this is not clearly in line with past work. Diagnostic tests suggest that this result 
is a consequence of the composition of our index. In particular, even as women are more 
likely to agree that “government should redistribute income from the better-off to those who 
are less well off,” they are less likely to agree that “ordinary working people do not get their 
fair share of the nation's wealth.” This makes good sense. And as noted above, our main 
                                                
19 These are excluded for the purposes of brevity, but are available upon request. 
	results do not shift when we use individual items rather than the index, and so we continue 
using the index alone here.  
Our principle interest is in the coefficients related to the APC model, of course. In 
Model 2, increasing age is associated with decreased support for redistribution. The estimated 
variance across cohorts also more than doubles from Model 1 to Model 2 (from 1.3 to 2.7). 
This is a product of more accurate estimates of cohort effects once we have accounted for 
societal changes in particularly income and education over the last century. The goal of 
subsequent analyses is to try to explain this residual variance — put differently, to account 
for this variance using a combination of past and current economic and policy measures. 
Models 3 and 4 are efforts at doing exactly this. Model 3 adds past and current 
economic context.20 Adding a combination of current and past contextual variables leads to a 
drop in the estimated cohort-level variance of roughly one fifth (from 2.7 to 2.1); and a drop 
in the estimated period-level variance of roughly one third (3.2 to 2.2). Clearly, our economic 
variables capture a good degree of the difference across both cohorts and periods. Even these 
simple statistics make clear that contextual variables matter — both in the past and in the 
present. 
But what is the nature of these contextual effects? Based on the results of Model 3 in 
Table 2, the effects of economic context during respondents' formative years, mostly support 
past work by Durr (1993), Stevenson (2001) and others, whose findings suggest that when 
the economy worsens, support for redistribution decreases. This finding confirms the luxury 
good hypothesis. Of course, our findings in this case are a product of past economic context, 
so they have a somewhat different interpretation: respondents who come of age during a 
                                                
20 We also estimated the effect of current and past macro economic context separately, but 
do not report these here for space reasons. The direction and significance of the coefficients 
remain unchanged to the combined Model 3, which suggests that the effects are largely 
independent.  
	period of economic crisis – in terms of high unemployment – tend to be less supportive of 
redistribution, ceteris paribus, for the rest of their lives. 
Current economic conditions matter as well, and here we find support for the 
government protection hypothesis. Unlike during respondents' formative years, current rising 
unemployment increases support for redistribution across all cohorts and ages. Both at c at at 
t, there seems to be no significant effect of economic development more generally, measured 
here using GDP growth. 
In the UK context, we find evidence of the co-existence of the luxury-good 
hypothesis (high socialization unemployment leads to anti-redistribution preferences) and the 
government-protection hypothesis (high current unemployment leads to pro-redistribution 
preferences). The reason for these contrasting results might be – as we have argued above – 
that the impact of macroeconomic circumstances has changed over time. While estimated 
effects of past conditions span almost a century, the effects of current conditions are for the 
post-1986 period only. So unemployment post-1986 may have a different effect, or at least 
produce a different reaction, than unemployment pre-1986. As noted above, poor economic 
conditions in a time when there is little to no welfare state may produce a different reaction in 
one's formative years than do the same economic conditions in a time when there is a vast 
welfare state. 
Model 4 in Table 2 tests our welfare state hypothesis. Here we use a simple dummy 
variable distinguishing the period before and after the rise of the British welfare state – which 
is relatively easy to implement given that most social welfare programs were established in 
Britain in the late 1940s. Based on the results of Model 4 we can find a large direct impact of 
the introduction of the welfare state, with a difference of 8 points between the cohorts that 
came of age before and those after its introduction in the late 1940s. The interaction between 
	the existence of the welfare state and unemployment during a cohort's youth is not 
significant. There is however an interaction with GDP growth. 
The estimated shift in the impact of GDP growth is illustrated in Figure 1, which 
shows predicted support for redistribution by GPD growth for two sets of cohorts – those that 
were socialized before the introduction of the welfare state (before 1949) and those that came 
of age since the introduction of the British welfare state (1950+). We plot the range of GDP 
growth that was experience by cohorts in the last century, -4 to +4. During an economic 
boom (GDP growth above 2 per cent) there is no difference between the two cohorts. During 
times of recession or normal GDP growth (GDP growth less then 2 per cent), the cohorts that 
did not grow-up with a welfare state are less likely to support redistribution to the poor, while 
post-welfare state cohorts are more likely to support redistribution. The former is in line with 
the luxury-good hypothesis; that latter is in line with the government protection hypothesis. 
We cannot demonstrate that the difference is due only to the rise of the welfare state, of 
course. But the relationship between macroeconomics and support for redistribution appears 
to have shifted markedly across cohorts, roughly at the time that the British welfare state was 
created. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Even independent of these time-varying effects, note that the results of HAPC models 
in Table 2 make clear the importance of taking into account both current and socialization 
contexts when accounting for individual-level differences in support for redistribution. 
Results from likelihood ratio tests of the null hypothesis that each model is not a significant 
improvement over the previous model(s). There is strong support that the socialization 
context as well as the current macro economy matter, as each subsequent model is a 
statistically significant improvement over the previous one. Results of tests are included in 
Appendix Table A3. The notion that current context matters to policy support is not 
	especially surprising — there is after all a growing body of work linking current economic 
context to voting behavior and policy preferences. But the importance of socialization in 
preferences for redistribution, alongside current context, is both new and important. 
Another way of assessing the fit of our model, is to compare the variance in 
redistribution preferences of cohorts across the different models reported at the bottom of 
Table 2. The top panel of the Figure 2 plots the predicted random effect coefficients for 
cohorts based on results from Model 2 (with no contextual variables). This figure is further 
the best illustration of generational differences in support for redistribution in the UK. 
Clearly, there are some powerful cohort differences in regard to redistribution preferences. 
Cohorts that came of age in the 1950s to early 1970s are most pro-redistribution; those 
socialized during the economic crises in the late 1970s and early 1980s are markedly less 
supportive; so too are those socialized during the Great Depression. The estimated cohort 
differences are reduced once we take into account socialization and current context, however. 
These results are shown in the bottom panel of Figure 2, which plots the random effect 
coefficients from Model 4. The implication here is that some of what we see in the top panel 
is a product of shifting economic context and the rise of the welfare state. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Robustness Tests 
Given the complexity of the models in Table 2, it is worth subjecting our results to a series of 
robustness checks. We have thus conducted a number of supplementary analyses, included in 
the Appendix. 
 The first re-runs the models in Table 2, but rather than rely on the index we use each 
individual survey question separately. This test is to confirm that our index-based model is 
not masking important differences across dependent variables. Results are included in 
	Appendix Table A4. A second robustness test check re-runs the models in Table 2, but with 
tougher constraints on the individual included in our model. Recall that our index takes on 
values for any respondent for which we have at least two of our four questions with 
non-missing values. This allows us to include a far greater number of respondents, but it also 
means that index values are, for about a third of our sample, a product of some varying subset 
of our four questions. So we re-run our models using only those respondents for whom three 
or more, or all four, responses are non-missing. Results are presented in Appendix Table A5. 
A third check focuses on the socialization period used. Recall that different studies have 
suggested somewhat different socialization periods; it follows that we should confirm that 
our results do not shift dramatically with minor shifts in socialization periods. We 
accordingly run models using several other possibilities. Results are presented in Appendix 
Table A6. In no case are results fundamentally different from what we have seen above. 
Another possibility not accounted for in the models above is that the impact of 
contextual economic variables, both currently and during respondents’ youth, is conditioned 
by individuals' own economic circumstances. In short, the preferences of wealthy 
respondents, more isolated from the effects of economic downturns, should be less affected 
by economic circumstances. This possibility is relatively easy to test for, in theory — we 
need only interact individuals' own economic circumstances with the contextual variables. In 
practice, we are constrained by the available data. Where current context is concerned, we 
use income quintiles as a 5-point interval-level measure (which seems unproblematic given 
that results using binary variables for quintiles in Table 2 suggest a roughly linear 
relationship), and allow individuals' income quintile to interact with each of the two current 
macroeconomic variables. In each case, we find a negative interaction between income and 
unemployment. This means that current unemployment, which tends to foster support for 
redistribution, has less impact on the attitudes of the rich than of the poor. The positive 
	interaction between income and GDP growth similarly suggests that the rich, who are less 
supportive of redistribution, are more so in times of economic boom (or less so in times of 
economic crises). These results are reported in Appendix Table A7 and Appendix Figure A7.  
We further test whether the existence of a welfare state during one’s youth has an 
impact on how one responds to current economic recession. We confirm the results that 
people who grew up with a welfare state react more strongly to increasing unemployment and 
recession. For example, as unemployment increases, the post-1950 cohorts demand more 
redistribution than do pre-1950 cohorts. The interaction effect between the expansion of the 
welfare state and current economic context is however rather weak.  These results are 
reported in Appendix Table A8 and Appendix Figure A8. 
As a final check, we estimate our models with a totally separate dependent variable, 
capturing not redistributive preferences so much as preferences regarding spending and 
taxation.21 Appendix Table A9 reports the results using this alternative dependent variable. 
Results support the welfare state hypothesis: there are no discernible effects of current 
macroeconomics, but robust effects of macroeconomics during respondents’ youth. The 
interactions with time suggest similar dynamics as well: the unemployment interaction points 
towards a reduction in the negative impact of unemployment over time, though the effect is 
not statistically significant; and the GDP growth interaction, which is significant, points to a 
marked reduction (indeed, as above, a reversal) in the positive effect of this variable. Note 
also that the estimated variance component for cohorts is greatly reduced from Model 2 to 4. 
Appendix Figure A9 illustrates this reduction in cohort effects.  
                                                
21 The question is as follows: “About the government choosing between these three options. 
Which do you think it should choose? (1) Reduce taxes and spend less on health, education 
and social benefits OR (2) keep taxes and spending on these services at the same level as now 
OR (3) increase taxes and spend more on health, education and social benefits.” Given that 
very few respondents selected the first option, we group responses (1) and (2) into one 
category (=0) to which we contrast those in favor of more spending and higher taxes (=1). 
Because we are using a binary dependent variable, models are estimated using a logistic 
model. 
	 
Conclusions 
The notion that economic conditions matter to individuals' attitudes about redistributive 
policy is not at all shocking. There is a considerable literature exploring the link between 
current economic conditions and redistributive preferences, after all. That past economic 
conditions — when we come of age — matter to redistributive preferences is novel and 
important however. Analyses above lend support to the idea that our redistributive 
preferences are partly a function of the lasting effects of the economic climate during our 
formative years. 
It is not just the economic situation that matters, however — it is the economy in 
conjunction with (i.e., moderated by) the welfare-policy context. This is the crux of what we 
have labeled the welfare state hypothesis; and although capturing policy context over a 
nearly-100-year period is difficult, our proxies produce what we regard as strong support for 
this possibility. Those who in their youth experience poor economic conditions at a time 
when there is a welfare state to rely on tend to be more supportive of the welfare state; this is 
less true for those whose experience is of economic weakness in the absence of a welfare 
state. This fact may help account for a literature that has found support for both the luxury 
good and government protection hypotheses. At a minimum, it highlights a novel 
heterogeneity in the individual-level relationship between economic conditions and 
redistributive preferences. 
That said, there clearly is more work to do. One logical next step is to consider not 
just the effects of economic and policy conditions as we come of age, but of political 
conditions as well. We have not considered here the possibility that the partisanship of 
government, or marked shifts in policy, during one's formative years have a lasting effect. 
There seem to be good reasons to believe that coming of age in the “Thatcher era,” for 
	instance, has a lasting effect on a range of policy preferences. The partisanship of 
governments may matter, then. So too might individuals' partisanship, particularly as a 
moderating factor in relation to both economic and political conditions. Existing research 
suggest some complex interactions between current economics and politics; it is likely that 
similar interactions exist for past conditions as well. 
We might also look for other measures of policy context, rather than the proxies we 
rely on above. There is to our knowledge no better measure available. But being able to 
accurately capture social welfare policy, or perhaps only certain social welfare policies, is 
critical. Not only might it provide more precise estimates of the moderating impact of policy 
— it might also help us to explore the potentially lasting impact of even short-term changes 
in both the welfare state, and economic conditions. Improved measures may also provide an 
opportunity to explore in more detail the interaction between welfare state policies and the 
economy, moderated by individuals’ own economic experience. 
For the time being, our analyses point to the value of taking socialization into account 
in understanding redistributive policy preferences, and indeed policy preferences more 
generally. Preferences for policy are, across a range of domains, characterized by a 
combination of change and stability. Understanding that stability, and, relatedly, 
understanding long-term differences across individuals as well, may depend in part on a 
serious consideration of the factors that lead us, early in our political lives, to favor one 
policy or another. 
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Table 1: Cohorts and their socialization context  
COHORTS N Obs Unempl GDP growth Redist. Index 
1) 1916-1920 353 1.4 -3.9 59.2 
2) 1921-1925 810 8.9 1.1 56.8 
3) 1926-1930 1,587 8.3 0.9 57.5 
4) 1931-1935 2,536 13.5 0.9 57.5 
5) 1936-1940 3,944 7.1 5.3 57.5 
6) 1941-1945 4,510 0.6 -0.9 56.8 
7) 1946-1950 4,971 1.4 0.6 56.2 
8) 1951-1955 5,375 1.3 2.9 56.8 
9) 1956-1960 6,068 1.5 2.0 56.7 
10) 1961-1965 7,077 1.6 2.6 57.5 
11) 1966-1970 6,495 2.1 2.0 58.5 
12) 1971-1975 6,984 2.3 1.8 57.8 
13) 1976-1980 7,866 4.1 1.7 56.1 
14) 1981-1985 7,135 9.2 2.1 55.5 
15) 1986-1990 4,898 7.6 3.1 53.9 
16) 1991-1995 3,139 8.5 1.4 52.0 
17) 1996-2000 1,913 4.8 3.4 51.2 
18) 2001-2005 887 2.9 2.5 51.8 
Note: The number of observations is based on valid responses of the dependent variable. 
 
 
  
	Table 2: Linear HAPC models on redistribution preferences: cross-classified random effects  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Pure APC Demographics Comb. Context Welfare Exists 
Individual Fixed Effects      
Age  0.009    -0.059  ∗∗  -0.026    0.007    
 (0.013)    (0.023)    (0.023)    (0.031)    
Female      -1.339  ∗∗∗  -1.337  ∗∗∗  -1.338  ∗∗∗  
     (0.161)    (0.161)    (0.161)    
Married      -0.207    -0.207    -0.205    
     (0.177)    (0.177)    (0.177)    
Union member      4.459  ∗∗∗  4.455  ∗∗∗  4.456  ∗∗∗  
     (0.194)    (0.194)    (0.194)    
Own house      -5.128  ∗∗∗  -5.128  ∗∗∗  -5.126  ∗∗∗  
     (0.196)    (0.196)    (0.196)    
University degree      1.154  ∗∗∗  1.163  ∗∗∗  1.163  ∗∗∗  
     (0.185)    (0.185)   (0.185)    
Religious (belongs to denomination)    -1.763  ∗∗∗  -1.767  ∗∗∗  -1.766  ∗∗∗  
     (0. 164)    (0. 164)   (0. 164)    
Income (Ref: 3rd Quintile)      
1st (poorest) Quintile    5.562  ∗∗∗  5.565  ∗∗∗  5.562  ∗∗∗  
     (0.282)    (0.282)    (0.282)    
2nd Quintile      2.901  ∗∗∗  2.904  ∗∗∗  2.905  ∗∗∗  
     (0.253)    (0.253)   (0.253)    
4th Quintile      -2.785  ∗∗∗  -2.785  ∗∗∗  -2.786  ∗∗∗  
     (0.242)    (0.242)    (0.242)    
5th (richest) Quintile    -3.910  ∗∗∗  -3.914  ∗∗∗  -3.914  ∗∗∗  
     (0.265)    (0.265)   (0.265)    
Labour force status (Ref: not working)    
Working    -2.381  ∗∗∗   -2.374  ∗∗∗  -2.378  ∗∗∗   
   (0.218)   (0.217)   (0.218)   
Unemployed    2.101  ∗∗∗   2.092  ∗∗∗   2.090  ∗∗∗   
   (0.403)   (0.403)   (0.403)   
Region     incl.   incl.   incl.   
Current Contextual Fixed Effects    
Unemployment      1.015  ∗∗∗   1.085  ∗∗∗   
     (0.229)   (0.241)   
GDP growth       -0.002   -0.009   
     (0.269)   (0.279)    
Socialization Contextual Fixed Effects     
Unemployment     -0.444  ∗∗   -0.312   
    (0.143)   (0.191)   
GDP growth     0.411   0.423   
    (0.333)   (0.325)   
War     -1.516   -0.031   
    (1.588)   (1.574)   
Welfare exists      8.090  ∗∗   
      (2.664)   
Exists X Unempl.         -0.130   
        (0.298)   
Exists X GDP         -1.986  ∗   
        (0.874)   
Intercept   56.111  ∗∗∗   66.159   ∗∗∗   60.805  ∗∗∗   56.051  ∗∗∗   
 (1.054)    (1.574)   (2.460)   (3.396)   
Variance Components     
Cohort (1916-2005)   1.253   2.683  ∗∗∗   2.058  ∗∗∗   1.551  ∗   
 (0.250)   (0.476)   (0.375)   (0.309)   
Period (1986-2010)   3.440  ∗∗∗   3.197  ∗∗∗   2.165  ∗∗∗   2.246  S ∗∗∗   
 (0.543)   (0.521)   (0.351)   (0.368)   
Significance levels: ∗ 𝑝<.05, ∗∗ 𝑝<.01 ∗∗∗ 𝑝<.001. Data: British Social Attitude Survey 
(1986-2010). Note: Entries are OLS coef. estimated by a mixed generalized linear 
model. Standard error in parentheses. N obs.: 54,563. 
  
	 
 
Figure 1: Predicted redistribution preferences by GDP growth over cohorts  
(including 95% C.I.) 
Note: Based on full estimation in Table 2, model 4 with the Redistribution Index as the DV, holding other 
variables at their current values. 
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Figure 2: Predicted random cohort effects on redistribution preference index  
(incl. 95% C.I.) 
 
 
